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Abstract 
We use new data to examine the effects of giant oilfield discoveries around the world since 
1946. On average, these discoveries increase per capita oil production and oil exports by up 
to 50 percent. But these giant oilfield discoveries also have a dark side: they increase the 
incidence of internal armed conflict by about 5-8 percentage points. This increased incidence 
of conflict due to giant oilfield discoveries is especially high for countries that had already 
experienced armed conflicts or coups in the decade prior to discovery. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do natural resource windfalls, such as those arising from the discovery of giant oilfields, 
increase the risk of internal armed conflict? Anecdotal evidence from Nigeria, Angola, and 
Iraq lead us to suspect that they may, and recent research (Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011, Besley 
and Persson 2009, 2011, and Acemoglu et al. 2010) even sheds light on the mechanisms that 
underlie some of these conflicts over resources. But as Norway, Canada, and Brazil show, not 
all oil rich countries experience conflict. Careful surveys of the literature on conflicts and 
natural resources (e.g. Ross 2004, 2006 and Blattman and Miguel 2010) show how difficult it 
has been to estimate the causal effect of oil on armed conflict in all but a handful of 
countries.2 The goal of this paper is to examine whether giant oilfield discoveries really do 
fuel internal armed conflicts around the world, and if so – in which settings.3  
We begin with a simple model, following Besley and Persson (2009), which guides our 
empirical analysis. In this model, giant oilfield discoveries increase oil revenues, generating 
windfall income for the incumbent. When the incumbent cannot credibly commit to share this 
windfall, the opposition may mobilize to challenge him, and this may lead to an internal 
armed conflict. Such conflicts over resources are especially likely in countries where political 
violence tends to translate into political and economic gains.  
To investigate this model’s predictions, we ideally require exogenous variation in resource 
windfalls. Finding such variation in multiple countries is challenging, since cross-country (or 
cross-conflict) comparisons may be contaminated by omitted variables bias. Using panel data 
to absorb country fixed effects is not straightforward either, because the quantity of natural 
resources extracted is a choice and oil prices may be affected by violent conflict. To 
overcome this difficulty, we focus on the discovery of giant oilfields, each of which 
contained ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of 500 million barrels (bbl) equivalent or 
more before extraction began (data on these giant oilfields are reported in Horn 2004).4 Of 
                                                                
2 Studies of the causal effect of natural resources on conflict tend to focus on specific countries. For example, 
Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Dube and Vargas (2010) study the effect of resource windfalls on conflict in 
Colombia, and Bellows and Miguel (2009) study this effect in Sierra Leona. Perhaps closer to our paper is 
contemporaneous work by Cotet and Tsui (2010) on oil and conflict, which we discuss below.  
3 Unless otherwise specified, we use “oil” as a shorthand for both oil and gas. 
4 For brevity we use a broad definition of oil, which also includes condensate and natural gas. To determine 
whether an oilfield has estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of 500 Million bbl of oil equivalent or more, the 
estimated reserves of oil and condensate are summed up. These are then added to the amount of natural gas, 
which is converted to oil at a ratio of 6,000 cu ft/bbl (Horn 2004). Note that ultimate recoverable reserves 
include the amount already extracted and the amount that has not yet been extracted. 
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the 910 giant oilfields that were known as of 2003, we focus on the 782 giants that were 
discovered since 1946 in 65 different countries. 
We argue that in a panel of countries with country and year fixed effects, giant oilfield 
discoveries are plausibly exogenous. To see why, consider how important giant oilfields are 
as a global source of hydrocarbons. Horn (2007) concludes that giant oilfields account for 
over 40 percent of the world’s URR of oil and gas. Discoveries of these fields are therefore 
economically important events, which are rare in all but a handful of countries: in only about 
4.6 percent of the country-year observations in our data was one or more giant oilfield 
discovered. It is true that countries can influence the prospecting efforts within their territory, 
and thus affect the discovery rate. But prospecting for oil is highly uncertain, and the odds of 
finding a giant oilfield are usually low, which is not surprising given the size of the prize. We 
therefore assume that the timing of giant oilfield discoveries is plausibly exogenous and 
discuss below some robustness checks that support this interpretation.5 But before we further 
discuss our causal interpretation of the findings, we first describe them. 
We find using a panel of 193 countries from 1946-2008 that on average oil production 
increases by about 35-50 percent within 4-10 years of a giant discovery. Giant oilfield 
discoveries similarly increase oil exports by about 20-50 percent within 6-10 years. 
Having found evidence suggesting a large impact of giant oilfield discoveries on oil output, 
we examine the model’s predictions regarding conflict. We find that on average giant oilfield 
discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed conflicts (measured as a year with 25 or 
more conflict casualties) by about 5-8 percentage points within 4-8 years of discovery, 
compared to a baseline probability of about 10 percentage points. 
We also find that the discovery of giant oilfields is especially likely to fuel internal conflicts 
in countries with recent histories of political violence. For example, giant oilfield discoveries 
increase the incidence of internal armed conflict by about 11-18 percentage points (compared 
to a baseline probability of about 37-39 percent) when a country experienced at least one 
such conflict in the decade prior to discovery. The effect of discovery on the incidence of 
internal armed conflict is similarly 11-14 percentage points (compared to a baseline 
probability of about 19-20 percent) in countries that experienced at least one coup in the 
decade prior to discovery. By contrast, in countries that experienced no internal conflicts or 
                                                                
5 Interestingly, we find no significant correlation between the number of giant oilfields discovered in a year and 
the inflation-adjusted price of oil in that year from 1946-2003. Still, if forward-looking agents search for oil and 
find it when they expect to have good opportunities to take advantage of giant discoveries, it is more likely that 
peace, rather than conflict, should follow discoveries. But our findings suggest that giant discoveries are actually 
followed by conflict. 
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coups in the decade before a discovery, there is no significant effect of giant oilfield 
discoveries on the incidence of internal armed conflicts. 
Turning to the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on economic outcomes, we find suggestive 
evidence that per capita GDP and government spending may increase by about 6 percent 
within the decade following a giant discovery. But unlike our results on conflict, these results 
are not robust to all the specifications we consider, which we discuss below. Moreover, we 
find no evidence that giant oilfield discoveries significantly affect private consumption or 
spending. 
To support our interpretation that the findings described above are the causal consequences of 
giant oilfield discoveries, we report results from a number of robustness checks. First, we 
address the concern that giant oilfield discoveries may have resulted from economic or 
political changes that preceded them. Reassuringly, we find no evidence of significant 
economic or political changes in the five years leading up to giant oilfield discoveries. We 
also test whether giant oilfield discoveries follow lulls in previous conflicts, and find no 
evidence to support this hypothesis. Second, we tackle the concern that giant oilfield 
discoveries are serially correlated over time, because some oilfields are close together, so one 
finding one may lead to another. While it is true that giant oilfield discoveries in a country’s 
recent past increase the odds that it finds a giant oilfield in a given year, controlling for these 
past discoveries leaves the findings discussed above essentially unchanged. Our results are 
also robust to excluding country-year observations within a decade or less of previous giant 
discoveries. Observations with giant oilfield discoveries account for only about 1 percent of 
the remaining sample, making them especially difficult to anticipate. Third, we address 
concerns that economic or political conditions shortly before discovery may affect our 
estimates, by showing that our results are robust to controlling for (instrumented) lagged 
dependent variables, lagged institutional quality (Polity 2), and lagged aggregate private 
investment. Fourth, we tackle the concern that observations with oil discoveries are different 
from others in ways that are difficult to measure directly. To do so, we use the Oil and Gas 
Journal Data Book (2008) to restrict our sample to observations where at least one oil 
discovery – not necessarily of a giant oilfield – was made. Regressions using this sample 
compare the effect of giant oilfield discoveries to the effect of smaller oilfield discoveries. 
Remarkably, even in this restricted sample we find that our results hold. 
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal conflicts in countries prone to violence 
has some implications for policy. For example, those who strive to reduce armed conflict 
should be concerned about oil rents that incumbents obtain in conflict-prone areas, especially 
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if those rents encourage challenges to the incumbents’ power. At the same time, the firms that 
prospect for oil in conflict-prone areas and those who regulate them ought to be concerned 
about negative externalities for many locals, who have little to gain from giant oilfield 
discoveries but may suffer from conflicts over the oil.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature, 
Section 3 presents a model of conflict over oil revenues, Section 4 discusses the data, Section 
5 presents our results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Concerns that some natural resources - including oil - may fuel internal armed conflicts arise 
from looking at oil-rich countries, such as Angola, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, and Indonesia. A 
number of influential papers, including Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) and Reno (1999) 
have investigated the relationship between natural resources and conflict, sparking 
considerable interest among social scientists and policy makers. Surveys of the developing 
literature on this topic, including Ross (2004, 2006), Humphreys (2005), and Blattman and 
Miguel (2010), tend to conclude that there is evidence linking oil to some instances of 
internal armed conflict. At the same time, not all oil-rich countries experience internal armed 
conflict, so these conflicts are clearly not inevitable.6 
Theoretical studies of the links between natural resource rents and conflict have focused on 
the possibility that these conflicts are the result of competition over resources. Summarizing 
this literature, Blattman and Miguel (2010) point out that models of armed conflict typically 
consider the cases where property rights are not well-protected, contracts are imperfectly 
enforced, and rulers are not always replaced by fair elections. Recent contributions to the 
literature on conflicts over resources include Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007), Dal Bó and Dal 
Bó (2011), Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), Caselli and Cunningham (2009), and Acemoglu 
et al. (2010). 
But despite all this research on the relation between natural resources and armed conflict, 
establishing the causal effect of resource windfalls on conflict around the world has proved 
difficult. Some of the best-identified studies examine causality using regional variation within 
                                                                
6 For example, Michaels (2011) and Caselli and Michaels (2009) find no evidence of armed conflict in the U.S. 
South and in Brazil. 
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countries. For example, Bellows and Miguel (2009) find that chiefdoms with more diamond 
wealth in Sierra Leona experienced more armed clashes, and studies of Colombia find that 
high coca prices increase conflict in coca producing regions (Angrist and Kugler 2008) and 
high oil prices increase conflict in areas where oil is extracted from or shipped through in 
pipelines (Dube and Vargas 2010).  
Collectively these and other within-country study suggest that natural resource windfalls can 
fuel armed conflicts, at least in some countries and settings. But in order to generalize these 
findings to the rest of the world and to better understand in what settings natural resource 
windfalls are more likely to cause armed conflict, it seems useful to look beyond the 
boundaries of specific countries. It turns out, however, that using variation from multiple 
countries to identify the effect of natural resource on conflict is not straightforward. To see 
why this is a challenge, consider first comparisons of resource rich countries with resource 
scarce ones, or of conflicts that occur in resource rich and resource scarce parts of the world. 
The main concern about this approach is that resource-rich areas may differ from others in 
ways that are difficult to measure and control for. For example, the Middle East is rich in oil 
but it also differed from other parts of the world in important ways before oil was discovered. 
These differences, which are notoriously hard to measure, along with oil abundance, may 
have caused subsequent conflicts, and telling apart the causes is difficult. To overcome the 
problem of fixed differences between countries, we could consider a second approach, which 
interacts country-specific measures of oil abundance with variation over time in oil prices. 
But this approach suffers from a problem of reverse causality, since conflicts may raise oil 
prices, as they probably did during the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the Iranian Revolution in 
1979, the Kuwait War in 1990, and the Libyan Civil War in 2011, making the direction of 
causality between conflict and resource revenues difficult to ascertain.7 A third approach we 
could try instead uses time-varying measures of oil production or exports in each country. 
But this approach also has problems in shedding light on causality, since countries choose the 
amount of oil they extract, and potential buyers may also choose how much to buy from 
whom. These choices may respond, directly or indirectly, to armed conflicts or their 
underlying causes.8 
                                                                
7 The possibility that internal conflict in Libya increased oil prices was discussed by the media. See for example: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12522291. When we regress an indicator for internal conflict on an 
interaction of an indicator for countries with at least one giant oilfield and the log of inflation-adjusted oil price, 
controlling for country and year fixed effects, we get a coefficient of 0.044 (s.e. 0.024), suggesting a positive 
and marginally significant relation between the two. 
8 For example, the recent internal armed conflict in Syria appears to have reduced its oil production: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c9d67952-e823-11e0-9fc7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1aOqrle6u 
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Since identifying the causal effect of natural resources on conflict is difficult using the 
approaches described above, our paper focuses on the discovery of giant oilfields as a more 
plausibly exogenous source of variation. The closest paper to ours in this respect is 
contemporaneous work by Cotet and Tsui (2010), which examines the relationship between 
oil reserves and discoveries and conflict in using a panel of countries. Our paper differs from 
theirs in a number of ways. First, our analysis is guided by a theoretical model, and this leads 
us to examine predictions that differ from theirs. Second, we examine oil output and exports, 
in addition to conflict incidence as our main outcomes of interest, while they focus primarily 
on conflict onset. Third, we use different data from theirs - our analysis is focused on giant 
discoveries and we use smaller discoveries only as controls. Fourth, in addition to examining 
the main effects of giant discoveries we investigate interactions of giant oil discoveries with 
measures of past violence, while they examine interactions of (not necessarily giant) oil 
discoveries with democratic and non-democratic countries. Finally, we use different 
empirical specifications, which examine lagged outcomes within a decade of discovery, while 
they focus on contemporaneous outcomes. Despite these differences, our findings, like theirs, 
suggest no contemporaneous relation between oil discoveries and the onset of conflict. But 
we also look a few years after giant discoveries and do find an increase in the onset of 
conflict. When we focus on conflict incidence, rather than onset, the effects we find are even 
bigger. And as we note above, the higher incidence of conflict following discovery appears to 
be due to discoveries in countries with recent histories of violence. But before we turn to our 
empirical evidence, we first outline a simple model that helps guide our empirical 
investigation. 
 
 
3. A Model of Conflict for Resources 
 
To guide our empirical analysis, we begin with a simple model of conflict over resources, 
following Besley and Persson (2009).9 The model focuses on two potentially conflicting 
groups denoted by J: an incumbent I and an opposition O. Each group makes up half of the 
population and can mobilize a fraction AJ of its citizens to serve in its army. The decision of 
each group whether or not to mobilize an army is discrete, and is denoted by δJ ∈ {0, AJ}. 
The probability that power transitions from the incumbent to the opposition is determined by 
                                                                
9 As we explain below, we depart from their model only in relatively minor details. 
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a conflict function: Prob(change of power)= ½ + (1/μ)[δO- δI]. The parameter μ captures the 
degree to which the country can resist political violence, and low values of μ mean that it is 
more prone to political violence as a means of transferring power. We assume that AI/μ ≤ ½ ≤ 
1 - AO/μ, which holds as long as μ is sufficiently large.  
The winning group has access to government revenue denoted by R, which comes from 
natural resources. These resources must be shared according to an institutional rule, which 
stipulates that the incumbent gets (1-θ)2R and the opposition gets 2θR, where θ ∈ [0, ½]. In 
other words, we consider sharing rules that range from institutions that lead to complete 
equality (θ = ½) to institutions where the winner takes all (θ = 0).  
In addition to any revenues they may receive from the government, each citizen supplies one 
unit of labor to the market, earning a real wage w. A group that wants to finance its army 
does so by taxing its population. Since we are interested primarily in bilateral internal 
conflicts (as opposed to one-sided conflicts), we departure from Besley and Persson (2009) 
by assuming that the opportunity cost of fighting is equal for the opposition and the 
incumbent.10 
The timing of events within each period is as follows. First the amount of resources at the 
government’s disposal, R, is determined randomly. We assume that if a giant oilfield is 
discovered then R = RH, and otherwise R = 0.11 Second, the opposition decides whether to 
mobilize its army to fight the incumbent. Third, the government decides whether to mobilize 
its own army to fight the opposition. We assume that both the opposition and the incumbent 
only mobilize if the net expected returns to mobilization are strictly positive, and an internal 
conflict takes place if at least one party mobilizes an army. Fourth, these choices and the 
probabilistic conflict technology then determine who wins power. Finally, the winner 
allocates the resources R. 
Given our assumptions, the expected per capita payoff to incumbent members is: 
w(1- δI)+[½ - (1/μ)(δO- δI)(1-2θ)]2R, where the first term wages net of taxes, and the second 
is the expected size of the transfer. Similarly, the expected payoff to opposition members is:  
w(1- δO)+[½ + (1/μ)(δO- δI)(1-2θ)]2R.  
                                                                
10 Besley and Persson (2009) study repression as one-sided violence by an incumbent, which has lower 
opportunity cost of fighting than the opposition since he can finance part of his army by taxing that opposition. 
In our empirical analysis (Subsection 5.3) we therefore examine the possibility of repression in the aftermath of 
giant oil discoveries. 
11 Besley and Persson (2009) do not focus on oil discoveries but on rents in general. Our assumption of two 
states of the world – with and without giant oil discoveries – makes the model more closely related to our 
empirical analysis. 
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To solve for the equilibrium we identify the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the 
sequential game where the opposition moves first. It turns out that this game has two 
equilibria: 
Peace (when neither side mobilizes): δO = δI = 0, which occurs when 2R(1-2θ)/w ≤ μ. 
Internal conflict (when both sides mobilize): δI = AI and δO = AO, which occurs when 2R(1-
2θ)/w > μ.  
This model guides our empirical analysis of the effect of giant oilfields in a number of ways. 
First, the model assumes that giant oilfield discoveries increase oil revenues. While this 
assumption seems very plausible, it may take time to start generating revenues from newly 
discovered oilfields, especially if it is difficult to extract the oil or if the discovering country 
lacks the appropriate technology, capital, or infrastructure. Our first empirical challenge is 
therefore to determine whether oil production and oil exports increase significantly within a 
few years of discovery, and if so – by how much. 
Second, we investigate the effect of oil discovery on internal armed conflict. The model 
predicts that in countries where 2RH(1-2θ)/w > μ, the discovery of a giant oilfield ends peace 
and sets off an internal conflict. This can happen when the incumbent receives most of the oil 
revenues, and cannot commit to sharing them with the opposition. If conditions are otherwise 
ripe for conflict, a giant oilfield discovery can fuel conflict over the oil revenues.  
Third, giant oilfield discoveries are likely to set off conflict only in countries where political 
violence is seen as effective, namely where μ is sufficiently low. Empirically, we identify 
countries with low μ as those with a history of internal conflicts or coups in the decade prior 
to the discovery of a giant oilfield. It is in those countries that we expect giant oilfield 
discoveries to trigger armed conflicts over the control of the oil revenues. The model also 
allows for the possibility that giant oilfield discoveries fuel conflicts in countries with low 
wages (which imply a low opportunity cost of fighting), poor institutions that increase 
inequality (θ close to zero represents “winner takes all” societies, where it pays to fight for 
control), or ethnic fractionalization that creates conflicting groups to begin with. In practice, 
however, underlying characteristics such as income, institutions, and ethnic fractionalization 
may be interrelated with each other and with the degree to which political violence pays off 
(μ). In the empirical analysis below (Section 5) we focus on the interaction of giant oilfield 
discoveries with empirical measures of μ, but we also examine other possible interactions 
related to the model.  
Finally, the discovery of a giant oilfield increases government revenues, R, and total per 
capita GDP, R + w. The increase of log per capita GDP in this model is ∂ln(R + w)/∂ln(R) = 
9
R/(R + w), or in other words the proportional increase in GDP as a result of an oilfield 
discovery is less than the proportional increase in oil revenues as a result of this discovery. 
Moreover, as we discussed, in some cases oil discoveries cause mobilization, and this may 
reduce civilian per capita GDP. Any additional factors which are not modeled, such as the 
cost of conflict or any distortionary effect of oil on the rest of the economy, may further 
reduce the net benefits of giant oilfield discovery. Given these caveats, Subsection 5.3 
investigates the effect of giant oil discoveries on GDP and its components. 
 
4. Data on Oil, Conflicts, and Economic Outcomes 
 
To analyze the effects of giant oilfield discoveries we require panel data on the timing of 
these discoveries in addition to outcome measures and control variables. Since country 
definitions differ across datasets, we use the country definitions from the Penn World Table, 
(Heston et al. 2009), a commonly used dataset, as the basis for our analysis.12 The Penn 
World Table reports data on countries from 1950-2007, but since we examine all the conflicts 
that took place after the end of the Second World War (see below), some of the variables we 
match in from other datasets span the period from 1946-2008.13 
 
Data on oil discovery and production. Our main regressor of interest is an indicator for the 
discovery of (at least one) giant oil field in a given country in a given year. We use data from 
Horn (2003, 2004), which reports the date of discovery, the name of the discovering country, 
and a number of other variables, for 910 giant oilfields discovered both onshore and offshore 
from 1868-2003. This dataset builds on previous datasets (e.g. Halbouty et al. 1970), and 
attempts to include every giant oilfield discovered around the world. To qualify as a giant 
(and thus be included in the dataset), an oilfield must have contained ultimate recoverable 
reserves (URR) of at least 500 million barrels of oil equivalent (MMOBE) before any oil was 
extracted.14 One limitation of these data is that the oilfields it describes differ considerably in 
the identity of those who estimated the URR and in the way the URR was estimated. 
Moreover, the estimated URR of various oilfields was gradually updated, depending on the 
                                                                
12 We add three Communist countries which existed until the early 1990s: the USSR (until 1991), Yugoslavia 
(until 1991), and Czechoslovakia (until 1992); the countries that emerged from these three are covered in our 
dataset from the year following the corresponding collapse. We also add North Korea, Myanmar, and 
Netherlands Antilles. Our results are robust to excluding these countries. 
13 We construct crosswalks for matching PWT countries to country names used in other datasets. 
14 This estimate sums up oil-equivalent measures of oil, natural gas, and condensate.  
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estimators and their methods.15 Since this process may induce measurement error issues 
across oilfields, we simply construct an indicator for whether a country is mentioned in the 
dataset as having discovered at least one giant oilfield in each given year. This does not avoid 
all forms of measurement error, as some oilfields may have been incorrectly included in the 
dataset or excluded from it, but we consider this a reasonable compromise given the 
limitations of the data. 
Of the 910 giant oilfields covered in Horn (2004), 782 were discovered from 1946 onwards, 
and these discoveries took place in 65 different countries. The 461 country-year observations 
with giant discoveries account for about 4.6 percent of all the observations in our data, so in 
all but a few countries giant oilfield discoveries are rare events (Table A1 lists the number of 
observations with discoveries in each discovering country). The rate of giant oilfield 
discoveries peaked during the 1960s and 1970s, and country-year pairs with discoveries were 
most common in Asia (41%), followed by Europe (18%), Africa (16%), North America 
(12%), South America (9%), and Oceania (4%).16 Table 1 reports summary statistics for our 
measure of giant oilfield discoveries and for other variables that we describe below.  
We complement our data on giant oilfield discoveries with data on the timing of other oilfield 
discoveries from the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book (2008). This source reports more 
discoveries than our main dataset, since it is not limited to giant oilfield discoveries, but its 
main drawback is that the quantity of oil discovered is not reported for most oilfields. In 
addition, these data seem to focus on oil-producing fields, so they may exclude some gas 
fields.17 But these data are still useful, since they allow us to restrict parts of our analysis to 
observations with oil discoveries, and compare the effect of giant oilfield discoveries to 
discoveries of smaller fields. 
Our final source for data on oil is Ross (2010), which reports the value of production of oil 
and gas by country and year from 1932 onwards.18 These data allow us to examine whether 
giant oilfield discoveries affect the value of oil and gas which a country produces. We 
                                                                
15 For example, some oilfields’ URR was updated from an earlier version of the dataset we use (compare Horn 
2004 and Horn 2003). 
16 The continent classification follows that of the United Nations Statistical Division. The country-year 
distribution of discovery by decades is 3% for 1946-1949, 15% for 1950s, 22% for 1960s, 22% for 1970s, 14% 
for 1980s, 17% for 1990s, and 7% for 2000-2003. 
17 Some fields covered in Horn (2004) do not appear in the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book (2008), even though 
this latter source covers smaller fields, so it reports more fields overall. This may because the coverage of the 
Oil and Gas Journal Data Book is uneven across countries, whereas Horn (2004) attempts to cover all giant 
oilfields in all countries. 
18 Details of data construction can be found in Ross (2010). 
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convert this variable into US$2005, in line with our other variables below, using the CPI 
index from US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Data on economic outcomes. The Penn World Table (PWT 6.3, 2009) is our source for 
GDP-related measures and population from 1950-2007. We use this dataset to construct 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per-capita GDP in constant US$2005, and to 
decompose it into private consumption, private investment, and government expenditure.19 
We also construct a measure of the real exchange by taking the ratio of the nominal exchange 
rate (XRAT, which measures dollars per local currency unit) to PPP. Using this definition, a 
decrease in the real exchange rate corresponds to a real exchange rate appreciation. In 
addition, we supplement the PWT data with International Monetary Fund (IMF) data (Abbas 
et al. 2010) on public debt as a percentage of GDP.  
To measure countries’ international trade, we use the NBER-UN trade data (Feenstra et al. 
2005), which reports trade outcomes from 1962-2000. We construct per capita measures of 
oil exports and non-oil exports. This last measure is constructed by summing up the exports 
in SITC Revision 2 categories 33 (Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials) and 
34 (Gas, natural and manufactured). We convert all these measures into US$2005 as 
described above.  
 
Data on political violence. We use UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) to measure 
the incidence of internal armed conflicts from 1946-2008.20 One of our main outcomes of 
interest is an indicator for whether a given country experiences an internal conflict, which 
claims the lives of 25 people or more, in each given year. About 10 percent of our country-
year observations involve such conflicts, and these conflicts take place in 97 different 
countries. Almost half of the internal conflicts in our data took place during the 1980s and 
1990s, and the continent with the most conflicts was Asia (47% of conflict observations), 
followed by Africa (33%), South America (8%), North America (7%), Europe (6%), and 
Oceania (1%).21  
                                                                
19 PPP-adjusted GDP per capita is constructed using rgdpl (real GDP per capita, Laspeyres) and the components 
of GDP are constructed by multiplying each share, kc (private consumption), ki (private investment), kg 
(government spending), to rgdpl. All variables are from PWT 6.3. 
20 Conflicts are classified into four types in the UCDP/PRIO dataset: interstate, internal, internationalized 
internal, and extra-systemic (conflicts between a state and a non-state group outside its territory). Our main 
incidence measure is constructed using internal conflicts, but we consider others below. 
21 The country-year distribution of conflict incidence by decades is 2% for 1946-1949, 5% for 1950s, 10% for 
1960s, 15% for 1970s, 22% for 1980s, 27% for 1990s, 17% for 2000-2008. 
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For our robustness checks, we construct five other measures of internal armed conflict. The 
first is an intensity-scaled measure of internal armed conflicts, which takes on the value of 
one if the internal conflict’s death toll in a given year was 25-999, two if it was 1000 or more, 
and zero otherwise. The second is an indicator for having either an internal or an 
internationalized internal conflict, since conflicts may switch from one type to the other. The 
third is an indicator for having any type of armed conflict (internal or not). The final two 
measures, following Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Cotet and Tsui (2010), are an indicator 
for onset of internal armed conflict (having an internal conflict and no internal armed conflict 
in the preceding year) and a measure of internal armed conflict transitions (an indicator for an 
internal armed conflict in the current year minus the indicator for the previous year). 
Another measure of political violence that we use is an indicator for having at least one coup 
in a given year, using data from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Marshall 2011). A coup 
is defined as a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident or opposition 
faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the 
executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime, or an attempt to do so (we do not 
distinguish between successful or unsuccessful coups). About 5.5 percent of the observations 
are classified as having at least one coup, and coups thus defined took place in 116 different 
countries from 1946-2008. Coups were fairly evenly distributed from the 1960s onwards (and 
rarer before), and the continent with the most country-year observations with coups is Africa 
(51%), followed by Asia (25%), South America (9%), North America (9%), Europe (5%), 
and Oceania (1%).22 
As an indicator for repression, we use the measure for purges from Banks (2010). This 
indicator takes on a value of one if a country experiences at least one purge in a given year, 
and zero otherwise. A purge is defined as systematic murders and eliminations of political 
opponents by incumbent regimes. About 8.6 percent of our observations are classified as 
having had at least one repression, and repression thus defined took place in 112 countries 
from 1946-2008. Repressions peaked during the beginning of the sample period - the1940s 
and 1950s - and gradually declined over time.23 
We also follow Besley and Persson (2011) in constructing an indicator for countries with 
strong institutions. They use the fraction of time spent having the highest score for executive 
constraints variable (XCONST) from Polity IV project (Marshall et al. 2010) as the criterion 
                                                                
22The country-year distribution of coup incidence by decades is 4% for 1946-1949, 7% for 1950s, 19% for 
1960s, 20% for 1970s, 20% for 1980s, 18% for 1990s, 12% for 2000-2008. 
23 The country-year distribution of repression incidence by decades is 32% for 1946-1949, 30% for 1950s, 17% 
for 1960s, 11% for 1970s, 3% for 1980s, 2% for 1990s, and 1% for 2000-2008. 
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for having strong institutions.24 In our analysis, we also use the Polity 2 score from the Polity 
IV project as a measure for institutional quality. This is a common measure of a country’s 
political institutions, taking on values from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly 
democratic). Finally, we use the ethnic fractionalization measure from Alesina et al. (2003).  
 
 
5. Results 
 
This section begins by discussing our baseline empirical specifications and estimates of the 
effect of giant oilfield discoveries on oil production and exports and on internal armed 
conflicts (Subsection 5.1). We then discuss the robustness of our estimates using a number of 
alternative specifications (Subsection 5.2). We conclude this section by discussing the 
estimates of giant oilfield discoveries on other economic and political outcomes (Subsection 
5.3). 
5.1. Baseline Specifications and Results 
 
In order to examine the effect of giant oilfield discoveries, we use our panel data on countries 
over time to estimate the following specification: 
 
Yit+j = β1jDiscit + Countryi + Yeart + εit,    (1) 
 
where Yit+j is the outcome in country i in year t+j, Discit is an indicator for the discovery of a 
giant oilfield in country i in year t, Countryi and Yeart are country and year fixed effects, and 
εit is a stochastic error. We estimate this specification for different lags j, where in most cases 
for j ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}. This allows us to non-parametrically trace the effect of discovery on 
outcomes over a decade. In addition, some of our specifications add controls, as explained in 
below and in the various tables.  
As we discuss later on, we find that after controlling for country and year fixed effects, the 
timing of giant oilfield discoveries is largely uncorrelated with countries’ economic and 
political performance in the five preceding years. One notable exception to this, however, is 
                                                                
24 Details can be found in Besley and Persson (2011, pp. 1430-1431). There are 26 countries they define as 
having strong institutions: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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that giant oilfield discoveries in a country’s recent past raise the odds of additional 
discoveries in its near future. Specifically, we find that the unconditional probability of a 
giant discovery in year t rise from about 1 percent when there were no giant oilfield 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1 to 87 percent if there was a giant discovery in every year from t-
10 to t-1. Controlling for country and (year fixed effects) significantly reduces the predictive 
power of past discoveries, though it remains statistically significant. In a regression where the 
dependent variable is Discit and the regressor of interest is the number of years with giant 
oilfield discoveries from t-10 to t-1, controlling for country and year fixed effects, the 
estimated coefficient is 0.032 (s.e. 0.004).25 
These results suggest that giant oilfield discoveries in a country’s recent past have some 
predictive power for whether it discovers yet another giant. We account for this serial 
correlation in the timing of giant oilfield discoveries by repeating our estimates of 
specification (1) with another specification, which we call (1a), and which includes the 
number of years with giant oilfield discoveries from t-10 to t-1 (labeled PDiscit) as a control.  
In addition to reporting estimates from specifications (1) and (1a) in tables, we also plot the 
regression estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for j ∈ {-5, -4, … , 9, 10} using 
figures. These figures allow us to economize on space when we examine whether pre-
discovery years differed from post-discovery years in terms of the outcomes of interest and to 
display outcomes in years t+j where j is zero or positive and odd. 
Having specified our baseline estimation strategy, we now examine the model’s first 
prediction (or rather its assumption) that giant oilfield discoveries increase oil revenues. As 
Panel A of Table 2 shows, oil production increases by about 25-30 percent within two years 
of a giant discovery. This effect of discovery on oil production rises to about 35-45 percent 
within four years, and remains stable (at least) until 10 years after discovery. Past discoveries 
also matter, and their effect declines from about 26 percent two years after discovery to about 
16 percent ten years after discovery. These large and precise estimates confirm that giant 
oilfield discoveries have an important economic impact on the discovering countries, as we 
can expect from the sheer size of these fields. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on oil exports. These 
discoveries raise oil exports by about 20-30 percent after six years, and this increases to about 
40-50 percent after ten years. Past discoveries again matter, increasing oil exports by about 
                                                                
25 One implication of this is that part of the effect of giant discoveries on subsequent outcomes may operate 
through a (slightly) increased change of making further discoveries. 
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10-20 percent. These estimates are similar to the effects we find on oil production, although 
oil exports appear to take a bit longer to respond to giant discoveries. 
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries increase per capita production and exports of oil 
lead us to investigate the second prediction of the model, that internal armed conflict increase 
after giant oilfields are discovered. Panel A of Table 3 documents the effect of giant oilfield 
discoveries on the subsequent incidence of internal armed conflict. In line with the second 
prediction of the model, we find that giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of 
internal armed conflict by about 5-8 percentage points during the years t+4 to t+8. This is a 
large effect, since the mean of this variable is just 10 percent, as we report in Table 1. Table 3 
also shows that our estimates of the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on internal armed 
conflict do not change much when we control for the number of discoveries in t-10 to t-1.  
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of internal conflicts is also 
not sensitive to the way these conflicts are measured. For example, Panel B of Table 3 shows 
that giant oilfield discoveries have a similar impact on an intensity-scaled measure of armed 
conflict, which gives more weight to conflict years with 1,000 casualties or more, as 
described in Section 4. Giant discoveries increase this scaled measure of internal conflict by 
about 6-9 percentage points within 4-6 years (or 4-8 years for specification 1a). Panel C of 
Table 3 shows an increase of 5-8 percentage points within the same lags from discovery year 
in a measure of conflict, which includes both internal and internationalized internal armed 
conflicts.26 
Given this evidence that giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed 
conflict, we now ask: which countries are particularly likely to experience internal conflicts 
after giant oilfield discoveries? According to Prediction 3 of our model, armed conflict over 
the oil revenues is prevalent in countries where political violence pays off. In order to identify 
these conflict-prone countries, we use past violence as an indicator. As Panel A of Table 4 
shows, countries that experienced one or more coups from t-10 to t-1 were more likely to 
plunge into internal conflict following discoveries. In fact, in these countries giant oilfield 
discoveries raised the incidence of an internal conflict by as much as 11-14 percentage points 
from t+4 to t+8. This figure is high, but we should bear in mind that the mean incidence of an 
internal conflict following a coup is about 19-20 percent. By contrast, for countries that 
                                                                
26 We also estimate similar regressions for the onset of internal armed conflict and for internal armed conflict 
transitions, find no contemporaneous relation between these and giant oilfield discoveries, a finding that is 
similar to Cotet and Tsui (2010). These measures increase significantly 4 years after discovery. 
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experienced no coups from t-10 to t-1, oil discoveries have no significant effect on the 
incidence of internal conflict, again consistent with the model’s predictions. 
Another indicator that political violence pays off is that a country already experienced 
internal conflict at some point from t-10 to t-1. In those countries, giant oilfield discoveries 
raise the probability of conflict by as much as 11-18 percentage points. The baseline level of 
violence in these cases is also very high, with a mean about 37-39 percent. Panel D of the 
table shows that we again find no significant effect of giant oilfield discoveries in countries 
with little previous history of violence. 
 
5.2. Robustness of Our Main Results 
 
The results discussed so far suggest that giant oilfield discoveries increase oil output and the 
incidence of internal armed conflict, and that the latter increase particularly worrisome for 
countries with recent histories of violence. We now examine the robustness of each of these 
results, and we start by looking at what happens in the years leading up to giant oilfield 
discoveries. 
Sub-Figure A of Figure 1 shows estimates of specification (1) for our measure of oil 
production before and after discovery. The figure suggests that oil production did not change 
much in the five years leading up to giant oilfield discoveries. Similarly, Sub-Figure B of 
Figure 1 shows that oil exports also did not increase during the lead-up to the discovery of 
giant oilfields, and we can again see that oil exports took longer to respond to giant oilfield 
discoveries than oil production. Sub-figure C of Figure 1 shows that internal armed conflict 
also did not change significantly in the years leading up to giant discovery.27 Finally, Sub-
Figure D of Figure 1 shows that in countries that experienced at least one internal armed 
conflict from t-10 to t-1, conflicts did not systematically flare up in the years prior to giant 
oilfield discoveries.  
The four sub-figures of Figure 2 similarly show estimates to the corresponding sub-figures of 
Figure 1, except that this time we control for the number of years with giant oilfield 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1 (these estimates are generated using specification (1a) instead of 
                                                                
27 Another way to examine whether giant oilfield discoveries occur during periods of lull following conflict is to 
estimate a regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for giant discovery and the regressor of 
interest is a an indicator for having no internal armed conflict in periods t-j to t-1 and conflict in period t-j-1, for 
j∈{1,2,3,4,5}, controlling for country and year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest in all these regressions is 
small and imprecise, providing further evidence that lulls in fighting do not predict the timing of giant oilfield 
discoveries. 
17
specification 1). These results once again show no evidence of significant trends before 
discovery. Moreover, the estimates are quantitatively very similar to those in Figure 1. From 
this point on, to save on space, we discuss only estimates that control for discoveries before t, 
as in specification (1a). 
In Figure 3 we examine the changes before and after discovery in some of the alternative 
measures of conflict discussed above. Sub-Figures A and B of this figure correspond to 
Panels B and C of Table 3, using as outcomes internal armed conflicts scaled by intensity and 
internal armed conflict including ones that were internationalized. These outcomes, like our 
main measure of armed conflict, show little change in the years leading up to discovery, and 
become positive and significant within 4-8 years after discovery. Sub-Figure C of the figure 
corresponds to panel A of Table 4, showing that in countries that had at least one coup from 
t-10 to t-1, internal armed conflicts increase more with giant oilfield discoveries, and there 
were no significant changes in the years leading up to discovery. Sub-Figure D shows similar 
results for countries that experienced any type of armed conflict from t-10 to t-1. 
The finding that our key variables of interest do not change systematically in the years 
leading up to giant oilfield discoveries is consistent with our interpretation that the estimates 
what takes place following giant oilfield discoveries reflects these discoveries’ effect on the 
discovering countries. In the following paragraphs we address further potential concerns 
about this interpretation.  
One concern that may linger, for example, is that there might be serial correlation not only in 
the timing of giant oilfield discoveries but also in the outcomes we examine. To address this 
concern, panel B of Table 5 re-estimates specification (1a), but this time controlling for the 
dependent variable in t-1, which is instrumented by the dependent variable in t-2. The 
outcome here is our measure of oil production, and the estimates are smaller than the 
baseline, but still positive and significant.  
Another related concern is that political conditions in the discovering country may have 
changed shortly before discovery. But Panel C of the table adds to specification (1a) a control 
for polity 2 (a common measure of intuitional quality) in t-1 and this does not change the 
estimates much. Since we do not have a measure of investment in the oil sector, Panel D 
reports estimates of specification (1a) with a control for log PPP-adjusted per capita private 
investment in 2005 US dollar in t-1, and again the estimates remain statistically significant. 
Panel E adds together all the controls from Panels B-D, and again the estimates remain 
significant for t+2 through to t+10, this time with the exception of the estimate for t+8, which 
is marginally significant. 
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While the results discussed so far include all discoveries of giant oilfields since 1946 and 
control for discoveries in countries’ recent past, a concern remains that the odds of discovery 
are not the same in all countries and in all years. More specifically, the regressions discussed 
so far include country-year observations where the probability of discovery is relatively high 
given the history of past discovery, along with many (most) observations where the odds of 
discovery were low. Panel F of Table 5 focuses on giant oilfield discoveries that were 
especially surprising, since no giant oilfield was discovered in the country from t-10 to t-1. 
When we exclude those observations, giant oilfield discoveries are made in just over 1 
percent of the remaining observations, so these discoveries were in all likelihood highly 
unexpected. The results show that the effect of these unexpected discoveries on oil 
production are actually about twice as large as in the baseline, and precisely estimated. This 
is probably because in the countries that make these discoveries, oil production prior to the 
giant discovery was usually very low. 
Another potential concern regarding our identification is that the countries that discover giant 
oilfields differ from others in ways that change over time and are therefore not fully 
controlled for by country fixed effects. To address this concern, Panel G re-estimates the 
baseline specification using only countries that make at least one giant discovery in the period 
we analyze (from 1946 onwards). The estimates in this specification are similar to those in 
the baseline, but slightly larger.  
Finally, we address the concern that country-year observations with oil discoveries are 
somehow different from others not only across countries, but also within countries, and in 
ways that we cannot observe and control for directly. To mitigate this concern, we use data 
from the Oil and Gas Journal Data Book (2008), which records country-year pairs where 
some oil discoveries, not necessarily giant, were made. Estimating specification (1a) using 
only these country-year observations, we essentially compare observations with (and 
following) giant oilfield discoveries to years with (and following) smaller discoveries. As 
Panel H of the table shows, even using this variation alone, the effect of giant oilfield 
discoveries on oil production is positive and significant, albeit smaller, for t+6 to t+10. 
Table 6 repeats the robustness checks described above for our main result, that giant oilfield 
discoveries increase the probability of internal armed conflict from t+4 to t+8. Controlling for 
the (instrumented) lagged dependent variable, lagged polity 2 score and lagged investment, or 
all of these together, tends to increase the coefficients very slightly, and they remain 
statistically significant. Excluding observations that follow one or more discoveries in t-10 to 
t-1 makes the estimate for t+4 imprecise, but the coefficients for t+6 and t+8 are still precise 
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– the latter is even larger than in the baseline specification. Restricting the sample to 
countries with giant oilfield discoveries leaves the baseline coefficients almost unchanged. 
And using only observations with some oil discoveries tends to increase both the point 
estimates and the standard errors, leaving the estimates for t+4 and t+6 positive and 
statistically significant. 
Table 7 reports estimates for the same robustness checks as before, but this time for the effect 
of giant oilfield discoveries on internal armed conflicts in countries that experienced at least 
one year of conflict from t-10 to t-1. As before the controls we include make little difference 
to our estimates when they are included separately or simultaneously: the estimates for t+4 to 
t+8 remain significant and change little in magnitude. Excluding observations with recent 
past discoveries makes the estimate for t+4 imprecise, but the estimates for t+6 and t+8 are 
still precise. Restricting our analysis to the set of countries with giant oilfield discoveries 
again makes almost no difference relative to the baseline. Finally, using only observations 
with some oil discoveries, while restricting our sample to about 400 observations, still gives 
positive and significant estimates for t+4 and t+6. 
Our regressions so far have emphasized that the effect of oil discovery on conflict are larger 
in countries with a history of conflict. We now compare the interaction of discovery and 
recent conflicts with interactions of discovery with other features of the discovering country. 
To do so, we begin by estimating the following equation: 
 
Yit+j = β2jDiscit + γ2jPConfit + δ2jPDiscit + θ2jDiscit x PConfit + Countryi + Yeart + εit,   (2) 
 
where PConfit measures the number of years from t-10 to t-1 in which country i experienced 
internal armed conflict. Panel A of Table 8 reports estimates of β2j and θ2j for j ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 
10}. As the table shows, θ2j is positive and significant for 4, 6, 8, and even 10 years after 
discovery, confirming again that oil discoveries spell trouble in countries with recent histories 
of violence.  
We now add to this specification interactions of discovery with other country characteristics, 
following our discussion in Section 3. First, we consider the possibility that in countries with 
strong institutions, giant oilfield discoveries lead to less conflict. To test this, we add to 
specification (2) an interaction of discovery with strong institutions, which may proxy for an 
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institutionalized commitment to share revenues with the opposition (θ close to ½).28 Second, 
much of the literature (see survey in Blattman and Miguel 2010) finds that conflicts are more 
prevalent in poor countries. In the model this corresponds to low-wage countries, and given 
our data limitations we proxy this using lagged per capita GDP. Specifically, we examine 
whether giant oilfield discoveries are more likely to tip poor countries into internal conflict 
by further adding to specification (2) controls for log per capita GDP in t-1 (as discussed in 
the data section) and its interaction with our indicator for discovery, Discit. Finally, we 
consider the possibility that in countries with higher ethnic fractionalization, oil discoveries 
are more likely to cause conflict, possibly because those countries are more prone to be 
divided into opposing factions that willing to fight each other. We test this hypothesis by 
further adding to specification (2) an interaction of our measure of ethnic fractionalization 
(again see data section) with Discit. Panel B of Table 8 shows that none of the three 
interactions we added is statistically significant in any of the regressions, while the 
interaction of discoveries and past conflict is still positive and significant from 4 years after 
discovery onwards. This suggests that the countries that should be most concerned about 
tipping into violent conflict over resources are those with recent histories of conflict, but not 
necessarily with other institutional features. 
 
5.3. Additional Results 
 
The results discussed so far suggest that giant oilfield discoveries may have two opposing 
effects on the discovering countries economy: they increase its revenues (from oil) and at the 
same time increase the incidence of a costly internal conflict. We now turn our attention to 
the fourth and last we discuss in the model section – whether these discoveries have a 
positive or a negative effect on per capita GDP and its components. For these outcomes, 
Table 9 reports estimates of specification (1a), and an augmented specification, which 
includes controls as in Panel E of Tables 5-7, namely the dependent variable in t-1 
(instrumented by that same variable in t-2) and polity 2 and log PPP-adjusted per capita 
private investment, both also measured in t-1.  
Panel A of Table 9 suggests that giant oilfield discoveries may increase per capita GDP by 
about 4-6 percent. But as Panel B shows, this estimate is imprecise when more controls are 
                                                                
28 As discussed above, the definition of strong institutions indicator we use comes from Besley and Persson 
(2011). Since the indicator itself is time invariant, its main effect is absorbed by the country fixed effects. 
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added. Having also experimented with similar specifications with various controls, we 
conclude that the positive effect we find in Panel A is not very robust, so we are unable to say 
conclusively whether giant oilfield discoveries have a small positive effect on per capita 
GDP, or whether this effect is zero.  
The next two panels of Table 9 show similar results for the effect of giant oilfield discoveries 
on per capita government spending. Once again the effect is either significant and around 4-6 
percent (Panel C), or insignificantly different from zero (Panel D) when more controls are 
added.  
The rest of Table 9 shows that giant oilfield discoveries have no significant effect on per 
capita private consumption and (with the exception of one negative estimate for t+6 in panel 
H), also no effect on per capita private investment.29 
We conclude this section with an investigation of other possible economic and political 
consequences of giant oilfield discoveries in Table 10. In Panels A and B of this table we test 
one of the mechanisms often discussed in the “Dutch Disease” literature (e.g. Corden and 
Neary 1982), that natural resource booms may cause a real exchange rate appreciation. This 
may happen, for example, if an oil-producing country exports more than it imports, spending 
some of its revenues on local non-tradable goods. As a result of such spending, the nominal  
exchange rate may appreciate (if the exchange rate is flexible) or local prices may rise. Either 
(or both) of these can cause a real exchange rate appreciation, which can hurt the non-oil 
exporting industries. Panels A and B of Table 10, however, show that giant oilfield 
discoveries decrease the real exchange rate only for some years after discovery, and even 
then the effect is quite small and imprecisely estimated. Panels C and D similarly show that 
non-oil exports are not significantly reduced by giant oilfield discoveries. A more thorough 
investigation of various related “Dutch Disease” mechanisms is, however, outside the scope 
of this paper and we leave it for future work. 
We next examine an alternative hypothesis on a potential cost of oil production, namely that 
it may lead, in some cases, to over-spending and indebtedness by the government (for related 
discussions see Tornell and Lane 1999 and Manzano and Rigobón 2008). As Panels E and F 
of Table 10 show, we find no evidence to support this hypothesis for our full sample of 
countries. Again, we leave further investigations of this issue for particular countries or 
regions for future work. 
                                                                
29 We do not report figures for the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on per capita GDP and its components, but 
these are available on request from the authors, and they also suggest that the changes before and around 
discoveries are small and imprecisely estimated.  
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Turning to other political economy hypotheses on the effect of natural resources, Panels G 
and H of Table 10 examine whether competition over oil revenue takes the form of coups to 
replace the incumbent. As the table shows, we find no evidence that giant oilfield discoveries 
increase the odds of coups in the subsequent decade. Finally, the last two panels of Table 10 
test the prediction of Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), that resource windfalls increase 
repression. Our estimates, however, show no significant increase in repression in the 
aftermath of giant oil discoveries.  
In sum, the results discussed in this subsection suggest that while the economic gains from 
giant oilfield discoveries to the local population may be limited, we do not identify other 
costs to from discovery, except for our main result of an increased likelihood of internal 
armed conflict.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We began this paper by asking whether natural resource windfalls fuel internal armed 
conflicts, and if so – in which settings. To answer this question, we use new data on giant 
oilfield discoveries to identify the effect of oil on economic and political outcomes around the 
world. We find that within a few years of giant oilfield discoveries, per capita oil production 
and oil exports in discovering countries increase by up to 50 percent. But we also find that 
discovering giant oilfields increases the incidence of internal armed conflict by about 5-8 
percentage points. This increase is driven predominantly by countries with recent histories of 
political violence – those that experienced coups or armed conflicts during the decade prior to 
discovery. We show that these findings are robust to a number of different specification 
checks and the addition of various controls. 
Our findings shed light on the questions we began with. Giant oil and gas field discoveries in 
Norway, Canada, and Australia, are unlikely to fuel internal armed conflicts, since these 
countries’ recent histories include little political violence. But in countries where political 
disputes are often resolved by violence (or remain unresolved despite violence), giant oilfield 
discoveries can fuel the flames of internal conflicts. 
Our finding that giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal conflicts in countries that are prone to 
violence also has implications for policy. Those who strive to reduce armed conflict should 
be concerned about oil rents that incumbents obtain in conflict-prone areas, especially if those 
rents encourage challenges to the incumbents’ power. At the same time, the firms that 
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prospect for oil in conflict-prone areas and those who regulate them ought to be concerned 
about negative externalities for many locals, who have little to gain from giant oilfield 
discoveries but may suffer from conflicts over the oil. 
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Outcome in year: Obs Mean Std. Dev.
First year 
of data
Last year of 
data
Discovery (indicator for giant oilfield discovery) 10,141 0.05 0.21 1946 2003
Indicator for any oilfield discovery, not necessarily of a giant 11,091 0.12 0.32 1946 2008
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita oil and gas production (US$2005) 3,759 5.33 2.92 1950 2007
Log per capita oil exports (US$2005) 4,599 2.64 3.48 1962 2000
Log per capita non‐oil export (US$2005) 5,562 5.69 1.92 1962 2000
Internal armed conflict indicator 11,091 0.10 0.30 1946 2008
Internal armed conflict indicator scaled by intensity 11,091 0.13 0.41 1946 2008
Internal or internationalized internal armed conflict indicator 11,091 0.11 0.32 1946 2008
Armed conflict indicator 11,091 0.14 0.34 1946 2008
Coup indicator 11,091 0.05 0.23 1946 2008
Repression indicator 8,497 0.09 0.28 1946 2008
Polity 2 score (between ‐10 and 10) 7,831 0.17 7.49 1946 2008
Ethnic fractionalization (time‐invariant measure, between 0 and 1) 10,650 0.44 0.27 1946 2008
Log real exchange rate 8,362 0.71 0.55 1950 2007
Log public debt as percentage of GDP 5,698 3.75 0.89 1946 2008
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita GDP (US$2005) 8,342 8.46 1.13 1950 2007
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita government spending (US$2005) 8,342 6.63 1.18 1950 2007
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private consumption  (US$2005) 8,342 7.97 0.99 1950 2007
Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment  (US$2005) 8,338 6.69 1.59 1950 2007
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for a panel of 193 countries from 1946‐2008. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated 
ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). There are 
461 observations with at least one giant oilfield discovery from 1946‐2003.
27
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8  t+10 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita oil and gas production in US$2005
Discovery 0.28 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.33
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.15
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 3,535 3,705 3,629 3,551 3,470 3,535 3,705 3,629 3,551 3,470
Panel B. Dependent variable: Log oil and gas exports per capita in US$2005
Discovery ‐0.04 0.14 0.25 0.37 0.40 ‐0.09 0.08 0.19 0.31 0.36
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 4,563 4,530 4,492 4,453 4,436 4,563 4,530 4,492 4,453 4,436
Table 2: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Oil Production and Oil Export
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel includes 193 
countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated 
ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered by country.
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Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8  t+10 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Panel A. Dependent variable: Internal armed conflict
Discovery 0.015 0.061 0.079 0.060 0.031 0.003 0.050 0.072 0.057 0.031
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.020 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.000
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Panel B. Dependent variable: Internal armed conflict scaled by intensity
Discovery 0.009 0.084 0.085 0.060 0.009 ‐0.002 0.076 0.081 0.060 0.012
(0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.018 0.013 0.007 0.000 ‐0.005
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Panel C. Dependent variable: Internal and internationalized internal armed conflict
Discovery 0.014 0.060 0.076 0.050 0.021 0.003 0.051 0.070 0.049 0.023
(0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.019 0.015 0.008 0.002 ‐0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Table 3: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel includes 193 
countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated 
ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by country.
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Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8  t+10 t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10
Panel A. Countries that experienced at least one coup from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery 0.044 0.139 0.140 0.114 0.047 0.041 0.136 0.138 0.113 0.048
(0.050) (0.044) (0.037) (0.033) (0.049) (0.048) (0.042) (0.034) (0.032) (0.049)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.070 0.055 0.034 0.009 ‐0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 2,605 2,605 2,557 2,457 2,347 2,605 2,605 2,557 2,457 2,347
Panel B. Countries that experienced no coups from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery 0.010 0.039 0.057 0.037 0.022 ‐0.001 0.026 0.046 0.025 0.012
(0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.016) (0.014) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 7,337 7,331 7,183 6,897 6,621 7,337 7,331 7,183 6,897 6,621
Panel C. Countries that experienced at least one internal armed conflict from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery ‐0.021 0.124 0.179 0.114 0.057 ‐0.032 0.113 0.172 0.108 0.053
(0.058) (0.049) (0.042) (0.046) (0.063) (0.050) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.059)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.040 0.042 0.026 0.016 0.011
(0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019)
Observations 1,958 1,958 1,907 1,797 1,679 1,958 1,958 1,907 1,797 1,679
Panel D. Countries that experienced no internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1
Discovery 0.019 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.005
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1 0.006 0.003 ‐0.002 ‐0.006 ‐0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 7,984 7,978 7,833 7,557 7,289 7,984 7,978 7,833 7,557 7,289
Table 4: Heterogeneous Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year observations. The panel includes 193 countries 
and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Giant oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate 
recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by country.
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Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Panel A. Baseline ‐ as in Panel A of Table 2
Discovery 0.215 0.297 0.310 0.329 0.332
(0.069) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.076)
Observations 3,535 3,705 3,629 3,551 3,470
Discovery 0.136 0.172 0.160 0.135 0.164
(0.050) (0.057) (0.067) (0.074) (0.076)
Observations 3,134 3,121 2,919 2,718 2,525
Panel C. As baseline, but controlling for polity2 score in t‐1
Discovery 0.215 0.279 0.259 0.254 0.266
(0.072) (0.062) (0.072) (0.075) (0.082)
Observations 3,290 3,400 3,296 3,185 3,068
Discovery 0.144 0.221 0.222 0.231 0.242
(0.070) (0.066) (0.077) (0.078) (0.084)
Observations 3,356 3,426 3,291 3,151 3,005
Panel E. As baseline, but with all controls from panels B‐D
Discovery 0.139 0.173 0.162 0.133 0.168
(0.050) (0.058) (0.068) (0.075) (0.075)
Observations 2,977 2,964 2,772 2,579 2,394
Discovery 0.384 0.574 0.555 0.627 0.672
(0.197) (0.189) (0.173) (0.184) (0.195)
Observations 2,202 2,337 2,302 2,269 2,226
Panel G. As baseline, but using only countries that discovered at least one giant oilfield
Discovery 0.239 0.320 0.338 0.355 0.352
(0.071) (0.064) (0.067) (0.070) (0.079)
Observations 2,570 2,686 2,637 2,587 2,535
Discovery 0.023 0.086 0.144 0.172 0.170
(0.080) (0.068) (0.070) (0.058) (0.063)
Observations 1,107 1,138 1,142 1,140 1,119
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Table 5: Robustness of Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Oil Production
Panel B. As baseline, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2
Panel D. As baseline, but controlling for log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel F. As baseline, but excluding observations with one or more discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1
Panel H. As baseline, but using only countries*year observations with one or more discoveries in the 2008 
Oil and Gas Journal Data Book.
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Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Panel A. Baseline ‐ as in Panel A of Table 3
Discovery 0.003 0.050 0.072 0.057 0.031
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Discovery 0.005 0.053 0.072 0.055 0.029
(0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 9,749 9,743 9,547 9,161 8,775
Panel C. As baseline, but controlling for polity2 score in t‐1
Discovery 0.009 0.060 0.086 0.065 0.036
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
Observations 6,894 6,888 6,726 6,407 6,087
Discovery 0.015 0.060 0.084 0.064 0.025
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036)
Observations 7,404 7,404 7,218 6,845 6,471
Panel E. As baseline, but with all controls from panels B‐D
Discovery 0.013 0.058 0.092 0.067 0.027
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.037)
Observations 5,942 5,942 5,789 5,481 5,171
Discovery 0.031 0.036 0.068 0.098 0.057
(0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.039) (0.040)
Observations 8,590 8,586 8,424 8,111 7,791
Panel G. As baseline, but using only countries that discovered at least one giant oilfield
Discovery 0.007 0.052 0.072 0.058 0.026
(0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Observations 3,572 3,570 3,504 3,374 3,244
Discovery 0.011 0.066 0.100 0.067 0.040
(0.033) (0.030) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035)
Observations 1,311 1,307 1,298 1,276 1,247
Table 6: Robustness of Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts
Panel B. As baseline, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2
Panel D. As baseline, but controlling for log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel F. As baseline, but excluding observations with one or more discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Panel H. As baseline, but using only countries*year observations with one or more discoveries in the 2008 
Oil and Gas Journal Data Book. 
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Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Panel A. Baseline ‐ as in Panel C of Table 4
Discovery ‐0.032 0.113 0.172 0.108 0.053
(0.050) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.059)
Observations 1,958 1,958 1,907 1,797 1,679
Discovery ‐0.029 0.115 0.176 0.110 0.050
(0.044) (0.043) (0.037) (0.036) (0.057)
Observations 1,948 1,948 1,898 1,788 1,670
Panel C. As baseline, but controlling for polity2 score in t‐1
Discovery ‐0.025 0.109 0.181 0.111 0.054
(0.050) (0.044) (0.036) (0.039) (0.062)
Observations 1,879 1,879 1,830 1,723 1,607
Discovery ‐0.012 0.125 0.196 0.128 0.066
(0.060) (0.048) (0.037) (0.040) (0.068)
Observations 1,753 1,753 1,704 1,597 1,481
Panel E. As baseline, but with all controls from panels B‐D
Discovery ‐0.019 0.109 0.198 0.130 0.066
(0.052) (0.049) (0.039) (0.038) (0.067)
Observations 1,708 1,708 1,662 1,558 1,444
Discovery ‐0.031 0.154 0.131 0.118 ‐0.009
(0.057) (0.082) (0.058) (0.057) (0.096)
Observations 1,437 1,437 1,400 1,323 1,236
Panel G. As baseline, but using only countries that discovered at least one giant oilfield
Discovery ‐0.026 0.113 0.172 0.108 0.049
(0.051) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.059)
Observations 986 986 964 916 864
Discovery ‐0.028 0.052 0.215 0.129 0.087
(0.066) (0.049) (0.056) (0.046) (0.066)
Observations 406 406 403 398 384
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Table 7: Robustness of Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Internal Armed Conflicts in 
Countries with at Least One Internal Armed Conflict in Decade Before Discovery
Panel B. As baseline, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2
Panel D. As baseline, but controlling for log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel F. As baseline, but excluding observations with one or more discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1
Panel H. As baseline, but using only countries*year observations with one or more discoveries in the 2008 
Oil and Gas Journal Data Book.
33
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Discovery 0.012 0.030 0.037 0.030 0.007
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1  0.044 0.028 0.015 0.005 ‐0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Discovery x (Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1) ‐0.007 0.013 0.023 0.017 0.016
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Discovery 0.085 0.191 0.079 0.071 ‐0.051
(0.252) (0.197) (0.188) (0.193) (0.169)
Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1  0.038 0.019 0.003 ‐0.010 ‐0.023
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log ppp‐adjusted per capita GDP in t‐1 ‐0.014 ‐0.010 ‐0.012 ‐0.013 ‐0.012
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027)
Discovery x (Years with internal armed conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1) ‐0.002 0.015 0.029 0.025 0.029
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Discovery x (Log ppp‐adjusted per capita GDP in t‐1) ‐0.003 ‐0.015 ‐0.009 ‐0.007 0.007
(0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Discovery x (Countries with strong institution) 0.028 0.029 0.077 0.088 0.102
(0.072) (0.062) (0.080) (0.086) (0.083)
Discovery x (Ethnic fractionalization) ‐0.102 ‐0.080 0.031 ‐0.018 ‐0.119
(0.121) (0.110) (0.097) (0.100) (0.118)
Observations 7,209 7,209 7,028 6,666 6,304
Table 8: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries and Interactions on Internal Armed Conflicts 
Panel B. As Panel A, but including various interactions of discovery
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
Panel A. As Panel A of Table 3, but including discovery interaction with number of years with internal 
conflicts from t‐10 to t‐1
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Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Discovery 0.040 0.048 0.036 0.059 0.059
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024)
Observations 7,937 8,266 8,108 7,940 7,760
Discovery 0.016 0.014 0.002 0.004 ‐0.001
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021)
Observations 5,839 5,838 5,532 5,222 4,912
Discovery 0.017 0.041 0.048 0.053 0.062
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029)
Observations 7,937 8,266 8,108 7,940 7,760
Discovery 0.017 0.026 0.035 0.035 0.023
(0.012) (0.018) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations 5,839 5,838 5,532 5,222 4,912
Discovery ‐0.004 ‐0.002 ‐0.009 ‐0.001 0.013
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 7,937 8,266 8,108 7,940 7,760
Discovery 0.015 0.017 0.003 0.010 0.015
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 5,839 5,838 5,532 5,222 4,912
Discovery 0.038 0.026 0.004 0.049 0.051
(0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038)
Observations 7,933 8,262 8,104 7,936 7,756
Discovery 0.008 ‐0.019 ‐0.053 ‐0.004 ‐0.005
(0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.043) (0.042)
Observations 5,834 5,833 5,527 5,217 4,907
Table 9: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Per Capita GDP and its Components
Panel B. As Panel A, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2, polity2 score in t‐1, and log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel D. As Panel C, but including controls as Panel B
Panel F. As Panel E, but including controls as Panel B
Panel H. As Panel G, but including controls as Panel B
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
Panel C.  Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita government spending in US$2005
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita GDP in US$2005
Panel E. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private consumption in US$2005
Panel G. Dependent variable: Log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005
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Outcome in year: t+2 t+4  t+6  t+8 t+10
Discovery 0.045 0.021 0.020 ‐0.014 ‐0.027
(0.033) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
Observations 7,957 8,286 8,126 7,956 7,774
Discovery 0.036 0.017 0.014 ‐0.035 ‐0.048
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037)
Observations 5,840 5,839 5,533 5,223 4,913
Discovery ‐0.053 0.020 0.017 0.001 0.030
(0.069) (0.070) (0.057) (0.065) (0.061)
Observations 5,519 5,475 5,431 5,387 5,367
Discovery ‐0.036 ‐0.008 ‐0.011 0.024 0.051
(0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.049) (0.068)
Observations 4,134 3,846 3,540 3,292 3,045
Discovery 0.046 0.041 0.045 ‐0.022 ‐0.067
(0.033) (0.039) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043)
Observations 5,144 5,424 5,517 5,438 5,337
Discovery 0.021 0.034 0.011 0.009 ‐0.024
(0.020) (0.035) (0.043) (0.045) (0.035)
Observations 3,733 3,725 3,577 3,305 3,038
Panel G. Dependent variable: Coup
Discovery ‐0.009 0.005 0.008 0.018 ‐0.005
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 10,135 10,129 9,933 9,547 9,161
Panel H. As Panel G, but including controls as Panel B
Discovery ‐0.007 0.002 0.014 0.009 ‐0.018
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017)
Observations 5,942 5,942 5,789 5,481 5,171
Panel I. Dependent variable: Repression
Discovery 0.007 ‐0.022 ‐0.019 ‐0.020 ‐0.003
(0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)
Observations 7,778 7,974 7,987 7,805 7,611
Panel J. As Panel I, but including controls as Panel B
Discovery ‐0.004 ‐0.032 ‐0.014 ‐0.009 ‐0.007
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 5,694 5,693 5,542 5,238 4,932
Panel C. Dependent variable: Log per capita non‐oil export in US$2005
Table 10: Effect of Giant Oil Discoveries on Other Outcomes
Panel A. Dependent variable: Log real exchange rate
Panel B. As panel A, but controlling for the dependent variable in t‐1, instrumented by the dependent 
variable in t‐2, polity2 score in t‐1, and log PPP‐adjusted per capita private investment in US$2005 in t‐1
Panel E. Dependent variable: Log Public debt (as percentage of GDP)
Panel F. As Panel E, but including controls as Panel B
Panel D. As Panel C, but including controls as Panel B
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one giant oilfield in a panel of country‐year 
observations. The panel includes 193 countries and uses data from 1946‐2008. All regressions include 
country, year fixed effects, and control for the number of years with discoveries from t‐10 to t‐1. Giant 
oilfields are those having an estimated ultimate recoverable quantity of oil, including gas and condensate 
equivalent, of at least 500 million barrels (Horn 2004). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by country.
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Outcome in year:
Years (from 1946‐
2003) with at least 
one giant oilfield 
discovery country
Years (from 1946‐
2003) with at least 
one giant oilfield 
discovery country
Years (from 1946‐
2003) with at least 
one giant oilfield 
discovery
Former USSR 41 Angola 7 Albania 1
Saudi Arabia 29 Malaysia 6 Austria 1
Iran 27 Colombia 5 Azerbaijan 1
United States 25 Pakistan 5 Bangladesh 1
China 21 Qatar 5 Cote Divoire 1
Iraq 20 Argentina 4 Denmark 1
Nigeria 19 Congo, Republic of 4 Ecuador 1
Australia 18 Netherlands 3 Equatorial Guinea 1
Libya 16 Peru 3 Gabon 1
Norway 15 Thailand 3 Germany 1
Canada 14 Trinidad and Tobago 3 Hungary 1
Indonesia 14 Tunisia 3 Morocco 1
Mexico 14 Bolivia 2 Namibia 1
United Arab Emirates 14 Brunei 2 New Zealand 1
Brazil 13 France 2 Papua New Guinea 1
United Kingdom 12 Italy 2 Philippines 1
Venezuela 12 Kazakhstan 2 Romania 1
Egypt 11 Myanmar 2 Russian Federation 1
Oman 10 Sudan 2 Spain 1
Kuwait 9 Viet Nam 2 Syria 1
Algeria 8 Yemen 2 Turkmenistan 1
India 8 Afghanistan 1
Appendix Table A1: Number of years (from 1946‐2003) with one or more giant oilfield discoveries, by country
Notes: This table reports the number of country‐year cells with one or more discovery of a giant oilfield from 1946‐2003, by country.
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Figure 1: Effect of giant oilfield discovery on oil production, oil export, and internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure A shows the effect of giant oil discovery on PPP-
adjusted per capita oil production in US$2005. Sub-figure B shows the effect of giant oil discovery on per capita oil export in US$2005. Sub-figure C shows the effect of giant 
oil discovery on internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure D is as sub-figure C but only with those having at least one or more years experienced internal armed conflict from t-10 
to t-1. The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-5 to t+10. The black lines show the estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% 
confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by country. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Details on variable construction 
can be found in the data section of the paper. 
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Figure 2: Effect of giant oilfield discovery on oil production, oil export, and internal armed conflicts with controls for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 
to t-1. Sub-figure A shows the effect of giant oil discovery on PPP-adjusted per capita oil production in US$2005. Sub-figure B shows the effect of giant oil discovery on per 
capita oil export in US$2005. Sub-figure C shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure D is as sub-figure C but only with those having at 
least one or more years experienced internal armed conflict from t-10 to t-1. The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-5 to t+10. The black lines 
show the estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by country. All regressions include 
country and year fixed effects and control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Details on variable construction can be found in the data section of the 
paper. 39
Figure 3: Effect of giant oilfield discovery on various measures of internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure A shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal armed conflict 
scaled by intensity. Sub-figure B shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal and internationalized internal armed conflicts. Sub-figure C shows the effect of giant oil 
discovery on internal armed conflicts but only for countries experienced at least one coup from t-10 to t-1. Sub-figure D shows the effect of giant oil discovery on internal 
armed conflicts but only for countries experienced any armed conflicts from t-10 to t-1. The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-5 to t+10. The 
black lines show the estimated coefficients and the grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by country. All 
regressions include country and year fixed effects and control for the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Details on variable construction can be found in the 
data section of the paper. 40
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